CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
Public poli c',-requires that everyT man shall be at liberty to work for himself and shall not be at liberty to deprive himself or the state of his labor, skill or talent, by any contract into 'hich he may enter. 'o put forth every effort for the accomplishment of useful ends and the happiness of himself and those dependent upon him is his mission and destiny. he is compelled by necessity which is the law of his being, to utilize and exercise his faculties and powers to procure shelter, food and raiment and it is only by a continuous struggle and in consequence of repeated failures and §,istakes that he can hope to become an intelligent, self-reliant and morally responsible me:-ber of society. The law being cognizant of these facts and ever watchful for the welfare of the state, has thrown the arm of protection about them to ward off the attacks of designing men, who are ever on the alert to take advantage of improvident persons, who for slight temporary gain could be persuaded to relinquish the usual vocations which afforded them a means of livelihood and would ultimately become a public charge.
On the other hand, public policy requires that when a man has, by skill, or br any other means, obtained sonething which he wishes to sell, he should be at liberty to sell it advantageously in the market, and in order to accomplish this desired result, he should be at liberty to preclude himself from eritering into competition with the purchaser. The ability of the poor man to earn a livelihood lies in the strength and dexterity of his own hands.
To hinder the employment of this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, or to prevent its sale in the market where the greatest returns may be had, is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and those who might wish to negotiate with him and will not be tolerated by public policy.
Hence public policy does not rebtrain him from alienating that which he wishes to alienate, but enables him to enter into any stipulation, however restricted it is, provided that restrjction in the judgment of the court is not unreasonable, having regard to the subject matter of the contract.
These briefly are the lines of reasoning upon which is founded the doctrine of the common law, that a "Contract in restraint of trade is void as against public policy."
In proceeding to a general discussion of the merits and demerits of the question which forms the subject of our investigation and research, we must constantly bear in mind that the reasons above enunciated have been modified, as the laws of trade have become better understood, as our commercial system has been developed and by the enormous changes in our social state. They had their origin in the dark ages when the country was in a primitive state and to deprive a man of the right to use his craft was to encourage idleness and render the person so restrained a dangerous member of society when the avenues of industry were few ; and when, as in Ln- gland, the people were forced to unite in combinations and to exert their individual efforts in a common cause in order that they might be able to withstand the powerful political contrivances of William the Conqueror. The situation of to-day and the outlook of the future is vastly different to those barbarous times and call for new views and wider action.
"Steam, and electricity have for the purposes of trade and commerce almost annihilated distance and the whole world is now a market for the distribution of the products of industry the great diffusion of wealth and the reckless activity of mankind striving to better, their condition have greatly enlarged the field of hiuxan enterprise and created a vast number of new industries, which give scope to ingenuity and employment for capital and labor."
HISTORY
Among the most ancient rules of common law, we find it laid down that bonds in restraint of trade are void. The fact that the restraint was partial as to time or space had no weight whatever when the contract restrained the industrial or business freedom of the individual. (2) Contracts involving a business protected by a tent.
In the case of the Morse Twist Drill and Machine Co. v.
Stephen A. Morse 103 Mass. 73, the defendant sold to the plaintiff two patents and agreed not to compete with him.
Defendant was also engaged to serve as superintendent of the company for a term of three years beginning July 1, 1864, and covenanted to devote his whole time and efforts for building up the business of the company. In consideration of these covenants, the company agreed to pay him five thousand dollars in thirty days ; five thousand dollars more out of the net earnings and profits of the business after paying certain dividends ; and fifteen hundred dollars per year for a term of three years, payable monthly.
After the coz, pany had been running for a time, the defend ant resigned and entered into the manufacture of the same patents elsewhere ; but sold them in the same market in competition with the plaintiff at reduced prices. To a bill in equity by the plaintiff to obtain an injunction the defendant demurred, upon the alleged ground that his covenants were in restraint of trade, contrary to public policy, and void, and that as such he had a legal right to avoid them. The court held that the doctrine had never been extended to a business protected by a patent. The restriction in the sale of a patent though extending through the whole country is obviously no greater than the interest of the vendee requires;
and by giving it, the vendor has been able to obtain an en-
hanced price for what he sold. This agreement was held to be valid and was enforced by injunction. It was held that the restraint was not greater, having regard to the subject matter of the contract,than was necessary for the protection of the purchaser.
In this country, there are periodical publicaAons that have a very wide circulation ; and it is obvious that a purchaser of the proprietorship cannot afford to pay the full value, unless he can obtain from the vendor a valid restriction against competition, which restriction shall be extensive as his interest requires, though it may cover the whole of a state, or the whole country. The same would be true of some books; e.g. the author of a popular school book could not sell its proprietorship for its full value, unless he could bind himself not to prepare another book which should be used in competition with it.
(4) Extraterritorial trade contracts.
In Perkins v. Lyman, 9 Tass. 522, the defendant for valuable consideration, covenanted that he would not be, directly or indirectly, interested in any voyage to the northwest coast of America, or in any traffic with the natives of that coast, for seven years ;but failed to stand by his covenant. It was argued in his favor that the covenant was void as being in restraint of trade. Per curiam, "The principle relied on does not apply to this case. This is a trade but lately discovered and it can be beneficial but to a small number of adventurers.
If one adventurer will engage to retire from it for a valuable consideration, and leave the con-duct of it to others, it is lawful for him to do so, and his contract to that effect will be binding on him. Instead of an injury to the public, the community may receive a benefit from such a procedure, as it will go to prevent the trades being overdone, and so becoming profitable to none.
PARTIAL OR LI17ITED RESTRAINTS
The leading American authority Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio
State 519, holds that to render a contract in restraint of trade valid it must appear :-
I.
THAT THE RESTRAINT IS PARTIAL.
THAT IT IS FOUNDED UPON Al ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION.
III.
THAT IT IS REASONABLE AND NOT OPPRESSIVE.
I. PARTIAL RESTRAINTS.
The definition of a contract in partial restraint of trade, has been said by the court in Horner v. Ashford, 3 Bing. 328, to be "one which limits an individual to or excludes him from a circumscribed district in the employment of his industry, talents or capital". Chitty in his work on contracts has declared it to be a "restraint subject to some qualification as to time or space". Strictly speaking, however, neither of these definitions are accurate. A more satisfactory classification is that adopted by the learned The decisions of the English Court are to the effect that the adequacy of the consideration will not be inquired into, and the parties must act on their own idea as to its sufficiency. So with the American authorities, the question whether or not the consideration for such restraint is adequate or inadequate is one into which the courts will not inquire.
Where a consideration recognized in law as being valuable, is paid, the law presumes that the matter has been deliberately considered by the parties to the transaction and that it is commensurate with the restraint imposed. An apt illustration is brought out in the case of Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass.
223.
The court thought the contract to be a reasonable one and the consideration of one dollar having been fixed and adopted by the parties as adequate, accepted the same as sufficient in law.
B. Seal as a consideration.
According to the law of contract generally the seal imports a valid consideration. This rule,of law, however, not only loses its force but has no application whatever to contracts in restraint of trade. This may at first seem to be a great innovation upon a well established principle of law, but when we take into consideration the reason upon which it is based we cannot doubt but that it is founded upon just and equitable ground. As said by Park B. in Wash v.
Day 2 M. and W. 277, "the consideration in this class of contracts is required for a different reason from that in the ordinary contract, viz. that here it would be unreasonable for a man to enter into such a stipulation without some consideration though it must be left to his own judgment to determine the amount and nature thereof.
C. Good will as a consideration.
The transfer of the good will of one's business may be the inducement on which the vendee makes the purchase and If, however, the circumstances of the transaction are set forth, that presumption is excluded and the court is to judge of those circumstances and determine accordingly.
If it is capable of construction which will render it valid, it is to be so construed. Where the circumstances of the transaction are not set forth, thus establishing the presumption of invalidity, it is always a question of law for the court to determine whether such 2ersumption has been overcome, and should never be submitted to a jury. 
III. DIVISIBILITY--
A contract may sometimes be valid in part and invalid in other particulars. As a general rule where a promise is made for one entire consideration, a part of which is fraudulent, immoral or unlawful, and the provisions as a whole are so connected in subject matter, depending on each other, operating together for the same purpose, or otherwise so connected in meaning as to be incapable of being severed, then the whole promise fails. But if there are several independent promises depending upon several distinct and corresponding considerations, the fact that the consideration upon which one of the promises is based is invalid, does not necessarily affect or destroy the validity and efficacy of the others.
Each promise with its corresponding consideration forms one entire and independent transaction in itself, and if made in compliance with the principles of law, will be recognized and enforced, notwithstanding the fact that a similar promise based upon an invalid consideration, which joined with it as a link in the chain of one entire transaction, falls to the ground for want of legal support.
Bishop v. Palmer, 146 Mass. 469.
IV. REEDIES--1. Action for damages.
It is often a doubtful question whether the sum stipulated to be paid on the non-performance of a condition is in the nature of a penalty, or is the amount settled upon by the parties for the purpose of making that certain which would otherwise be uncertain. It must rest upon the constrution to be given to the language used, aided by the facts proved, which gave birth to the instrument. In the ordinary contract the court is very apt to consider it as a penalty if the jury can, without great difficulty, decide approximately the amount of damage which the aggrieved party has sustain- 
CONCLUSION
Actuated by a desire to keep the extent of this discussion within reasonable limits, and to present briefly and concisely the more important and salutary phases of the subject, the writer has been obliged to disregard and cast aside much of the substance which would tend to give the main structure a more thorough and polished finish.
The very interesting subject of"combinations into which our present discussion frequently tempts us, forms in itself a question too extended for proper discussion here.
Involuntary restraints, as those imposed by grants, customs and by-laws have been dispensed with, not so much for the reason of time required for their treatment as to their impracticability.
The voluntary restraints, or those imposed upon the parties of their own free will, are those with which we have been chiefly concerned, and both from historical and practical standpoints afforded an interesting and pleasant research.
As to the present status of the law on this subject, little may be added by way of conclusion to what has already been said. At the early common law these contracts diminished the means of supporting the family, tended to deprive the public of the services of useful men, discouraged industry, diminished productions, prevented competition and enhanced prices. The effect of these contracts at the present time are too well understood to require assertion here. We have emerged from that semi-civilized state and there is no evidence that contracts in restraint of trade under the healthy regulations to which they are now required to conform, work any public mischief and the contract is not one of such a nature that it tends to deprive men of employment, and unduly raise prices or put an end to competition.
There is one thing very evident and that is that the idea public policy as it prevails throughout these contracts has today lost its force and application. would say,let us not enter him in the race of contracts in restraint of trade. He has no standing there. He might in the wilderness of some boundless prairie prove to be a steed worthy of his metal, but in the refined race track which modern civilization has erected for trade, he is neither useful nor ornamental but a menace to all.
